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This paper analyzes the effects of a legislative provision that grants a one-day paid leave of 
absence to blood donors who are employees in Italy. The analysis is based on a unique 
dataset with the complete donation histories of the blood donors in an Italian town. The 
cross-sectional variation in job market status and type of employers, and job switching over 
time by a subset of donors, are the sources of variation we employ to study whether donors 
are responsive to the paid-day-off incentive in the choice of their donation days, and in the 
frequency of their donations. Our results indicate that economic considerations do affect 
blood donation decisions, for donors donate in days of the week that, given the day-off 
benefit, maximize their material returns in terms of consecutive days off work. We also find 
evidence, however, consistent with heterogeneous motivations in different donors, since a 
subset of donors systematically do not take advantage of the material reward. Finally, we find 
that the day-off privilege leads donors who are employees to make, on average, one extra 
donation per year. We discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at increasing 
the supply of blood, and more generally for incentivizing pro-social behavior. 
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Studying the relationship between economic incentives and pro-social behavior carries major eco-
nomic and social consequences. Pro-social activities represent a substantial part of social life,
including actions with immediate as well as long-term beneﬁts such as donating money for a cause
or an organization, volunteering for a party during election times, cleaning beaches, or donating
blood. Millions of people, every year, dedicate time, eﬀort, and ﬁnancial resources to voluntary,
pro-social activities. Over sixty million Americans, for example, have undertaken volunteer ac-
tivities in 2006 (BLS, 2007), and the total value of volunteer time in the US is estimated to be
over $240 billion (Independent Sector, 2006). In recent years, moreover, a number of scholars have
argued that pro-social activities represent an important manifestation of a country’s social capital
which, together with other immaterial characteristics such as trust, culture and religion, appears
to contribute explain a country’s long-run economic prosperity and growth.1
In this paper, we study how material incentives inﬂuence a particularly relevant pro-social
activity: blood donations. Blood transfusions are required in such critical situations as massive
blood loss due to trauma, blood replacement during surgical interventions, and the treatment of
premature babies, as well as to treat several chronic diseases.2 In recent years, the demand for blood
has increased dramatically, due, among other causes, to population aging and to new medical and
surgical procedures, such as organ transplants (DiRado 2004, www.bloodbook.com). Blood supply
is not keeping up with demand, however, and situations of shortage are the rule rather than the
exception in most Western countries, and even more so in developing nations.3 Neither eligibility
criteria, nor a lack of information seem to explain why this supply shortage is occurring, since,
for example, only 1/8th of eligible Americans (40% of the population) donate, and information
campaigns, as well as communications about shortage periods (for example during the summer
season and around the holidays), are conducted with high frequency. An alternative cause left
to be explored concerns people’s behaviors and incentives. Individuals might simply ﬁnd it not
worthwhile to dedicate time to blood donation if the beneﬁts of donating blood fall short of the
opportunity costs. This implies that explicit incentives might play a role in stimulating donations,
which are, in most countries, based on voluntary, unpaid contribution.
The question of whether extrinsic incentives help or hinder the propensity to donate blood and
more generally the performance of altruistic activities, however, is theoretically ambiguous and
empirically unsettled. Standard economic theory would predict that, with the addition of a new
set of incentives for the performance of a given activity, agents should increase the supply of that
1See, for example, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), McCleary and Barro (2006), and Tabellini (2008).
2There is no available substitute for human blood, therefore all blood needed must be supplied by individuals.
Synthetic blood substitutes are at a very early stage of development and still a long way before they can replace real
blood in routine transfusions (Squires 2002, HemoBiotech 2008).
3In the US, the American Red Cross and other organizations collecting blood need to have, at each point in time,
the blood necessary for three days of demand at each location and for each blood type, but this target is seldom met,
especially for rare blood types. Moreover, it is estimated that worldwide, there is currently a shortage of about 22
million units of blood (HemoBiotech 2008).
2activity. Or, if the performance of that particular activity is not responsive to the new set of
incentives, its supply should just not change (Solow 1971, Arrow 1972). A few recent theoretical
works, however, argue that extrinsic incentives, and especially those of economic or monetary
nature, might crowd out the quantity and quality of the supplied altruistic activity. Benabou
and Tirole (2006), in particular, build a model where individuals perform altruistic activities to
increase their social reputation and self-respect. The introduction of economic rewards creates
doubts about the true reason behind pro-social behavior, thus potentially crowding out intrinsic
motives. Economic incentives, therefore, can backﬁre instead of adding up to altruistic motivations.
These ﬁndings formalize the early claims of Titmuss (1971) about the negative eﬀects of paying
for blood, in terms of both lower quality of blood, and lower quantity since people would refrain
from a prosocial activity if it is paid. Titmuss’ 1971 book The Gift Relationship, in fact, was very
inﬂuential in marking the end of a paid blood supply system in the US in the 1970s (Healy 2006,
Shearmur 2007).
As for empirical studies, early experiments by Edward Deci and his collaborators found that
adding explicit rewards for the performance of activities which are originally motivated by intrinsic
reasons leads to a reduction in the performance of those activities (Deci 1975). More recently, similar
ﬁndings have been obtained by, among others, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000). Gneezy and Rustichini, however, ﬁnd that "large enough" incentives do stimulate
pro-social behavior. With speciﬁc reference to blood donation, Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008)
ﬁnd that Swedish female college students are less willing to undertake a health test in order to be
able to donate blood afterward, if they are oﬀered monetary incentives. The authors interpret their
results as consistent with the claims of Titmuss (1971), although no crowding-out was detected
among males. In partial contrast to these results, Goette and Stutzer (2008) conduct a large ﬁeld
experiment in Switzerland and ﬁnd that oﬀering lottery tickets to promote donations increased
turnout at the blood drives. In sum, the evidence on whether material incentives play a positive
role in attracting donors, just like they motivate other activities (Dionne and Vanasse 1997, Lazear
2000, Lach and Schankermann 2008) is mixed.4
We contribute to this literature by investigating the eﬀects of an explicit economic incentive
granted to Italian blood donors: the right to a paid day oﬀ work on the same day they donate
blood or blood components, introduced by Law 584 of 1967. The law applies to all donors who are
employed at any private or public organization, and salary and contributions are reimbursed by the
state. Our analysis is based on a unique, hand-collected, longitudinal dataset comprising the whole
individual histories of blood donations of the entire population of donors in an Italian mid-sized
4A number of studies have focused on other types of extrinsic motives, namely the quest for social recognition
through the performance of altruistic activities. Theoretical models, anecdotal evidence, and laboratory experiments
suggest that, in fact, individuals’ altruistic behavior is also driven by social-image concerns. See for example Harbaugh
(1998a, 1998b), Wedekind (1998), Nowak and Sigmund (2000), Price (2003), Ariely, Bracha and Meier (forthcoming),
Polborn (2007) and Lacetera and Macis (2008a). On the whole debate on the determinants of pro-social behavior,
see the comprehensive survey by Meier (2006).
3town (The Town) in the periods 1985-89 and 2002-06.5 In addition to demographic information
and the number and dates of donations made by about 3,000 unique donors, the database includes
information on the donors’ labor market status and occupation, as well as the identity of the
employers for those donors who are employees.
We ﬁrst exploit the cross-sectional variation in job market status and type of employers, and
the diﬀerent economic beneﬁts associated with donating in diﬀerent days of the week to test for
whether donors are responsive to economic considerations in a way that is consistent with standard
economic theory. Only those donors who are employees can beneﬁt from the day-oﬀ privilege. In
addition, since donations can be made only in the morning, Monday through Saturday, and most
donors-employees do not work on Saturdays, donating on diﬀerent days of the week carries diﬀerent
economic advantages. Donating on Fridays, in particular, potentially leads to the highest material
beneﬁt if an employee is free on Saturdays, since the donor-employee has, in fact, 2.5 consecutive
days oﬀ available after the donation. Donating on Mondays (or on Saturdays for those workers
who do not have Saturdays oﬀ) leads to having only two (or one and a half) full consecutive days
oﬀ. Any other day of the week allows for only one, isolated day oﬀ,a n dﬁnally, for those workers
who have Saturday oﬀ by contract (this being the case for the vast majority of Italian workers),
a Saturday donation does not bring any material beneﬁt. Our ﬁndings indicate that donors do
respond to the economic value associated to donating in diﬀerent days in a way that is consistent
with standard economic intuition. Donors-employees are signiﬁcantly more likely to donate on
Friday and (less strongly) on Monday compared to individuals out of the labor force. The latter
group of donors, instead, not being aﬀected by the possibility of a day oﬀ, tend to distribute their
donations uniformly during the week. Employers and self-employed individuals, who also do not
beneﬁt from the policy, tend to cluster their donations in those days in which they do not work:
Store owners disproportionately donate on Mondays, when stores in The Town are, by law, closed;
and other self-employed donors donate on Saturdays, when their businesses do not operate.
Economic considerations appear therefore as predominant over such concerns as sending a "bad
signal" about one’s generosity to the community by donating when material rewards are high-
est. Our results are even stronger when we focus on individuals employed in large ﬁrms, which
corroborates our interpretation of the ﬁndings. In fact, not only are workers in large ﬁrms less
"indispensable," therefore bearing a lower cost from leaving work during a business day, but unlike
workers in small ﬁrms, they are also heavily protected by strict ﬁring restrictions, and therefore
they should be much less concerned about taking days oﬀ compared to workers in small ﬁrms.
We also ﬁnd evidence suggesting that the motives that guide altruistic actions are heterogeneous
in the population. In fact, a substantial share of the population of donors-employees donates on
Saturdays, when the additional, explicit incentive is not present. In addition, donors-employees
who donate more frequently on Fridays (Saturdays) only rarely donate on Saturdays (Fridays).
5To protect the privacy of the donors in our database, we have agreed to keep the name of The Town (as well as
any other identifying information) conﬁdential.
4Therefore, there is a subset of donors who appear to perform pro-social activities for reasons
orthogonal to, or possibly colliding with, explicit incentives. The stability of behavior of individual
donors over time, which we are able to document thanks to the longitudinal nature of our data,
indicates the presence of diﬀerent "types" of contributors, consistent with the framework of Benabou
and Tirole (2006) and with similar ﬁndings on the response to high-powered incentives in the
workplace (Nagin, Rebitzer, Taylor, and Sanders, 2002).
Finally, we use the longitudinal nature of our data, i.e., the fact the we observe donors multiple
times over the period of interest, and the fact that a subset of donors switch job status, to test
whether the paid-day-oﬀ incentive induces donors who are employees to increase the number of
donations. Fixed eﬀects regressions comparing switchers to non-switchers reveal that donors who
are employees increase their donation frequency by one donation a year. The eﬀect appears to
be symmetric, in that a reduction in donation frequency is detected for donors who cease to be
employees. The evidence, therefore, is consistent with the paid-day-oﬀ provision stimulating more
donations. Although our micro-level evidence is focused on the intensive margin, i.e. on the change
in behavior of existing donors, aggregate evidence on the number of donors at the national level
shows that, following the introduction of the day-oﬀ provision at the end of 1967, there was no
reduction in the number of donors, which instead kept rising slightly above its previous trend. We
can therefore conclude that removing this policy (a measure, in fact, recently advocated by the
The Italian Employers’ Association as well as by the Central Government) would likely result in a
reduced number of donations.
In addition to providing novel ﬁndings from new sources of data, our study presents a num-
ber of methodological contributions with respect to the existing research on the impact of explicit
incentives on the performance of altruistic activities. Most of the existing studies are laboratory ex-
periments and analyze the intentions to perform some activities instead of their actual performance.
Some scholars have expressed concerns about the external validity of laboratory experiments. Both
existing lab and ﬁeld experiments use "ad hoc" incentives, making it more likely for donors to
suspect they are being observed. If potential donors infer they are being observed as a result of
an unusual oﬀer, then their behavior may be inﬂuenced not only by the incentive but also by the
perception of being scrutinized (on these issues, see Harrison and List 2004, List 2006, Levitt and
List 2007, and Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber, 2007). To the best of our knowledge, our study
is the ﬁrst to analyze the actual behavior of an entire population of blood donors in response to a
naturally occurring incentive, therefore it serves as a useful complement to the experimental liter-
ature. In addition, the individuals in our ﬁeld study are free not to enjoy the economic beneﬁts by
choosing the day of the week in which to donate, thus their choices are not constrained to a set of
options deﬁned by the experimenter. Many studies, moreover, use college students as subjects of
laboratory and ﬁeld experiments, and relatively gender-balanced samples. At least for the case of
blood donations, individuals under the age of 25 represent only a small portion of the population
5of donors,and women are only one-quarter of the population of donors.6 Finally, existing studies
rely only on cross-sectional data. By observing the same individuals multiple times, instead, we are
able to account for individual heterogeneity, and wea l s oc a na s s e s st h ep r e s e n c eo fs t a b l ep a t t e r n s
of individual behavior and revealed preferences on material rewards for pro-social activities. In
addition to being a substantive contribution, the identiﬁcation of "types" of donors also reduces
the possibility that our results are driven by "composition eﬀects."
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
institutional context of this study. Section 3 illustrates the theoretical framework guiding our
empirical analysis, and outlines our research design. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and
ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the ﬁndings and considerations on their welfare
and policy implications. All tables and ﬁgures are gathered in the Appendixes.
2 Data and institutional background
The data used in this study originate from hand-collected information on the whole blood donation
histories of all donors in an Italian town ("The Town" hereinafter) located in the Center-North
part of the country.7 Before describing the data in detail, we report on the blood donation system
in Italy and in The Town, since some features of the systems will be crucial for our empirical
identiﬁcation strategies.
2.1 Blood donation in Italy and in The Town
Blood donation in Italy is organized through blood banks, which are run by voluntary donor
associations. These associations have a central headquarter as well as town-level units. In order
to donate blood, an individual is required to become a member of one of these associations. The
three major associations, which are present in diﬀerent parts of the country and do not compete
with one another, are Associazione Volontari Italiani del Sangue (AVIS), with about 1.1 million
members in 2007, Federazione Italiana delle Associazioni Donatori di Sangue (FIDAS), with about
400,000 members (Caligaris 2007), and Fratres (150,000 members in 2000).8 Since the aﬃliation is
to a local unit of the national associations, blood donors predominantly donate in the town where
6The average donor is about 40 years old in most Western countries, and only a minority of donors are younger
than 25.
7The demographic, social, and economic characteristics of The Town’s population are highly representative of
the overall Italian urban population. Statistics comparing the Town with other Italian towns under a number of
socio-economic characteristics are available upon request.
8Blood donations run through blood banks and voluntary donor associations (which were present since the 1920s)
have become the oﬃcial blood donation and collection system in Italy, after a brief period, following the end of World
War II, when the Red Cross played a prominent role. Similar blood bank systems exist in other countries, such as
Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. In the UK, France, and Ireland, by contrast, the organization of blood
donation is run by the State. The Red Cross, ﬁnally, is the dominant organization managing blood donation in such
countries as Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, and the US. In the US, however, the system is more heterogeneous
and competitive, comprising the Red Cross, blood banks, and hospitals directly managing blood donations. See Healy
(2006) on the diﬀerent organizational modes of blood donations.
6"their" unit is located.
In The Town, blood donation is managed by the largest blood donor association, AVIS, and
aphereses of either whole blood or blood’s components (plasma, platelets) are performed at The
Town’s public hospital, Monday through Saturdays from 8 to 11 a.m. Donors do not make ap-
pointments, and they typically donate on a "ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served" basis.
The Italian law sets limits to the frequency of donations of blood and blood components. Whole
blood can be collected once every 90 days from male donors and once every 180 days from females.
Donors can give platelets once every 30 days and plasma once every 14 days.9 The time required
for a platelet or plasma donation is about one hour, against an average of twenty minutes for a
whole blood donation. Including the time to reach the donation site, the waiting time before the
donation and the resting time at the hospital after the donation (which is higher for whole blood
donation), on average a donor should expect a commitment of about two hours.
2.2 The Data
Using both AVIS’ and The Town’s hospital’s archives, we identiﬁed all of the Association’s members
(and, therefore, all of The Town’s blood donors) from 1985 to 2006, for whom we obtained the entire
donation history over this 22-year period. Information on donors includes sex, age, blood type, and
the date when each individual became a donor. Crucially for the aims of this paper, we have
information, for a subset of donors, on their occupational status, job, and, in the case of employees,
on their employers. AVIS does not update its members’ occupational status on a regular (e.g.,
yearly) basis. Within our period of interest, updates were made in 1985 and 2002. We therefore
limit our analysis to two subperiods, 1985 through 1989 and 2002 through 2006, attributing the
same job status in the update years to the following four years. This introduces the possibility that
for some donors and in some years occupation is recorded with error. Our results, however, do not
change substantially when we restrict the analysis only to the years 1985 and 2002.10
Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on our sample of donors. Over the years
1985-89 and 2002-06, 2,614 unique individuals have donated blood, 759 of whom were females. The
number of active donors has increased steadily over time, going from 543 in 1985 to 1,282 in 2006,
and so has the fraction of female donors, from 25 percent in the mid 1980s to about 29 percent
in recent years. The pool of donors has also aged over time, moving from an average age of 38 to
about 40 years. The vast majority of donors in The Town are repeat donors: The average number
of donations per year is 2.4 donations per year, and the median number of donations over the
9Conversations with doctors and AVIS oﬃcials in The Town revealed that the type of donation is "exogenous"
to a donor’s choice. Donors, in general, join the Association to donate whole blood, and are assigned to donating
blood components if they are not eligible to donate whole blood (e.g. if they have insuﬃc i e n ti r o ni nt h e i rb l o o d ) ,
or if there is some urgent need for a blood component. As a consequence, it is highly implausible that donors shift
types of donations toward more "frequent ones" (e.g. shift from whole blood to platelets) as the awards thresholds
approach.
10In addition, in the Italian labor market switching across broad occupational categories is limited, especially in
the short run. For these reasons, we are conﬁdent that the error in reporting donors’ labor market status is fairly
limited.
7whole period of interest is 13. Of the 826 donors active in the period 1985-89, 286 are still active
in 2002-06.11
[Table 1 about here]
Panel B of Table 1 displays the distribution of donors by labor market status.12 About 70% of
male donors, in both time periods, are employees. In 1985-89, the only period for which information
on the donors’ employer is available, about 12 percent of donors-employees worked for a large
employer — banks, companies oﬀering public services such as utilities, and companies with a presence
on a national level, which also operate in The Town. Self-employed and employers are relatively
more numerous in more recent years (13 percent of male donors in 2002-06 against 10 percent in
1985-89), with a greater share of store owners over other types of non-salary workers. As for women,
self-employed and employers represent only tiny fractions (and almost entirely composed of store
owners), with salary workers and non-employed donors being predominant. A large majority of
non-employed male donors are students. Among female non-employed donors, a sizable fraction is
represented by housekeepers.13 Only a relatively small fraction of non-employed donors are retired
or unemployed.
2.3 An explicit incentive to blood donors: a one-day paid leave of absence
According to the National Law 584 of 1967 (marginally amended in 1990), all donors who are
employed at any private or public organization have the right to a paid day oﬀ work, on the
same day they donate blood or blood components. Employers are refunded by the state for the
related salary expenses they incur (including social security and other contributions).14 The stated
objective of the law is to guarantee some rest to donors and to protect their health conditions. The
provision is therefore equivalent to adding sick days to those an employee is entitled to by contract,
with an important diﬀerence: Unlike an illness absence, when the employee is required to stay home
(a medical inspector can be sent to check for the sickness claim), this requirement does not hold in
the case of an absence for blood donation.15 To be able to claim the day oﬀ,d o n o r sm u s th a v ea
form signed by the doctor performing the apheresis. The Town’s hospital, unfortunately, does not
keep systematic records of which donors actually take the beneﬁt up. From partial records as well
11Over 60 percent of male donors who were below the age of 40 in 1985 were still active in 2002. In fact, reaching
the age limit is what mostly explains why donors cease to donate and hence drop out of our database.
12Donors whose occupational status could not be determined because of the incompleteness of the AVIS records
do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the rest of the donors in terms of age and other observable characteristics.
13The proportion of female donors who are housekeepers, however, declined from 27 percent in 1985-89 to about 15
percent in 2002-06, which reﬂects the increased labor force participation rates of Italian females in the past decades.
14Employees in other countries are typically allowed time during work hours to donate blood, usually without
deductions in salary or accrued leave, but in the vast majority of cases these provisions just give donors the material
time to make their donation, and in all cases the donor has to return to work after donating.
15Also similar to the rules regarding sick days is the absence of a formal requirement to inform the employer in
advance of the intention to donate blood, and to not go to work, by an employee. The employer cannot refuse, in
any case, to "concede" the one-day leave. This does not exclude that, on an informal basis, several employees give
prior notice to their employers.
8as our conversations with the doctors and the hospital administrators, however, we gathered that
take-up rates are quite high, especially during weekdays. Monday through Friday, four out of ﬁve
donors-employees take the day oﬀ, and this fraction drops to less than two out of ﬁve on Saturdays
(see Figure 7).
The typical work week of an employee is from Monday through Friday. Businesses, in particular,
as well as most public workplaces, do not operate on Saturdays. Some exceptions are given by
hospital doctors, whose work week typically includes some work over the weekend, teachers, since
in Italian public schools (attended by the near totality of students) students have only Sundays oﬀ,
and some employees in public workplaces such as City Hall clerks in oﬃces open to the public. A
further notable exception is given by stores, most of which are closed, by law, on Monday mornings
and are open on Saturdays.
3 Competing Hypotheses and Research Design
3.1 Theoretical framework
As a framework to identify competing hypotheses on the impact of material incentives in the per-
formance of pro-social activities, we outline a simpliﬁed version of the model proposed by Benabou
and Tirole (2006) — BT thereafter. In BT, the utility that agents maximize, when performing a
prosocial activity a,h a st h ef o l l o w i n gf o r m :
U(a,y;va,v y,y,f(va,v y),m a,m y)=vaa + vyy − c(a)+maE(va|a,y) − myE(vy|a,y). (1)
The pro-social activity a can be thought of as a continuous, countable, or dichotomous {0,1}
variable. In the case of blood donation, a may represent the number of donations an agent decides
to make over a certain period, or the decision to donate or not in, say, a given day or week. Each
agent is of a (va,v y)-type, where va expresses the marginal intrinsic beneﬁt from performing the
pro-social activity, and vy represents the marginal extrinsic beneﬁt from being given an additional,
explicit reward y. The type is known only to the agent, while the joint distribution of (va,v y)
is publicly known. The function c(a) is the direct cost of performing a,w h i l et h et e r mr =
maE(va|a,y)−myE(vy|a,y) represents the reputational concern: The individual might care about
her positive social image as an altruist from performing a, and the negative social image as "greedy"
from performing a when explicit rewards are provided. The social-image eﬀect is expressed in terms
of the updated beliefs of the population of reference on the values of va and vy for a given individual,
and the parameters ma and my determine the impact of these updated beliefs on the agent’s utility.
These parameters can be individual-speciﬁca sw e l l . 16
16In Benabou and Tirole (2006), an alternative intepretation of the social image component of the utility function
is in terms of self-image concerns (see also Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). The BT model also considers the degree of
visibility of the pro-social activity as aﬀecting the social reputational concerns of the agent. In our basic framework
we abstract from this visibility issue.
9The agent’s problem can be seen as choosing the level of a, given the other variables. Alter-
natively, given the parameters, an established level of a (e.g., donating blood once a year), and a
menu of extrinsic rewards Y , the agent can be thought of as choosing between the diﬀerent available
rewards (see also Section IV of BT).
Within this model, the standard, rational-agent approach can be expressed by the assumption
of both ma and my being equal to zero. If this is the case, purely altruistic and purely "extrinsic"
incentives would add to each other. Assuming that the direct cost function is well-behaved, an
increase in the extrinsic incentive y would never reduce the performance of the pro-social activity
a.O r ,i fam e n uo fd i ﬀerent levels of the explicit incentive y is proposed for the performance of a
ﬁxed amount of a, the agent will choose the highest available reward.17
By contrast, the impact of an extrinsic reward can have ambiguous eﬀects, once social or self-
image concerns are taken into consideration. On the one hand, the agent has an incentive to perform
more of the altruistic act; on the other hand, the beliefs about her type are revised downward if she
performs a high amount of the activity when explicit rewards are provided. The speciﬁcv a l u e so f
the parameters and the shape of the distribution will determine which eﬀects would dominate for
diﬀerent values of the explicit reward y. We could have a negative relationship between extrinsic
incentives and altruistic acts across the whole range of relevant values of y, or a positive relationship,
or even a non-monotonic relationship. For example, the supply of the pro-social activity might be
larger when no extra incentives are provided and when large explicit incentives are provided, and
lower for intermediate values of y (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).
3.2 Identifying the eﬀects of the day-oﬀ provision
Within a regime where a paid day oﬀ to employees is guaranteed, we identify a few sources of
variation that change the economic incentives to donate blood, in diﬀerent ways to diﬀerent groups
of donors. The ﬁrst source of variation we exploit is simply given by the diﬀerent days of the week,
and the second main source of variation is given by the fact that the day-oﬀ provisions holds only
for those donors who are employees, but not for, say, self-employed, business owners, and donors out
of the labor force such as housekeepers, retired, students, as well as the unemployed. In addition,
we use the fact that donations can be made, at the local hospital, Monday to Saturday only in the
m o r n i n g ,b e t w e e n8a n d1 1a . m . ,a n dt h a ts t o r e s are closed on Monday mornings and most other
business are closed on Saturdays. Given these features of the data and the institutional context,
below we describe the alternative hypotheses we test, and we detail the adopted identiﬁcation
strategies.
17Note that this standard approach does not exclude that individuals might derive intrinsic beneﬁts from performing
ac o s t l ye ﬀort. The original critiques by Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) to Titmuss’ (1971) conjectures about the
negative impact of monetary incentives on blood donation, for example, were not excluding the presence of purely
altruistic motives: They were questioning, instead, the presence of a conﬂict between diﬀerent motives.
103.2.1 The choice of the donation day
Consider, ﬁrst, the reaction of existing donors to diﬀerent extrinsic incentives. For donors who
are employees, Law 584 essentially allows to choose from a menu of material incentives of various
magnitude. Since donations can be made only in the morning and most donors-empoyees are free
on Saturdays, donating on Fridays potentially leads to the highest material beneﬁt (if leisure is
taken as a good), since the donor-employee has, in fact, 2.5 consecutive days oﬀ available after the
donation (excluding the morning of Friday). Donating on Mondays leads to having "only" two full
consecutive days oﬀ; moreover, a Monday donation and consequent day oﬀ m i g h tb el e s sr e w a r d i n g
since most stores are closed on Monday morning, therefore the paid time oﬀ has a smaller set of
activities in which to be spent. Any other day of the week allows for only one, "isolated" day oﬀ,
and ﬁnally, for those workers who have Saturday oﬀ by contract, a Saturday donation does not
bring any material beneﬁt. The highest explicit beneﬁt, call it yH, is received if the donor donates
(i.e., a =1 ) on a Friday, according to our previous arguments. An intermediate beneﬁt, yM, is
received from Monday to Thursday, and zero explicit beneﬁt, yL =0 , from donating on a Saturday
(for simplicity, we equate Mondays to any other weekday). The donor therefore compares these
three utility levels:
UF = va + vyyH + maE(va|yH) − myE(vy|yH) − c(1); (2)
UW = va + vyyM + maE(va|yM) − myE(vy|yM) − c(1); (3)
US = va + maE(va|yL =0 )− myE(vy|yL =0 )− c(1). (4)
Given her own type, the size of the explicit incentive, and the impact of her choice of the donation
day on her social or self image, the donor will choose the donation day that maximizes her utility.
If we observe employees clustering their donations on Fridays, for example, this would imply that
UF >U W and UF >U S, and therefore material incentives dominate over other drivers, consistent
with standard economic intuition. If the bulk of donations are observed on Saturdays, instead, this
would be evidence consistent with agents preferring not to receive any extrinsic beneﬁts. A large
share of donations on both Fridays and Saturdays might indicate that smaller rewards are even
less appealing than no rewards, as the negative image consequences are greater than the direct
gains. However, when explicit rewards are high enough, then donors respond positively to them.
By contrast, a majority of donations in weekdays diﬀerent from Friday would indicate that smaller
rewards provide a better balance between the positive impact of direct material incentives and the
negative impact on image from taking on those rewards. The longitudinal nature of our data also
allows us to record the donation-day choice of each individual multiple times. We can therefore
assess whether diﬀerent habits by diﬀerent donors emerge, thus hinting at some heterogeneity in
the level of altruism, response to material incentives, and concerns for image being present in the
population.
11T h ed a t aa l s op r o v i d e st w od i ﬀerent "control groups" against which to interpret the donation
behavior of donors-employees. These groups are composed of employers and self-employed donors
on the one hand, and donors who are out of the labor force on the other hand. Neither group
of donors is aﬀected by the paid-day-oﬀ provision. However, these two groups diﬀer in terms of
their potential incentives to donate throughout the week. A self-employed or business owner will
be faced with a menu of two levels of economic incentives. If, for example, the business is closed
on Saturday (or Monday, as in the case of stores), there is no direct economic loss from donating
on Saturday (Monday). As for donors out of the labor force, intrinsic and extrinsic incentives,
as deﬁned here, should not change across diﬀerent days of the week. If donors are attentive to
economic incentives when making their donation decisions, then we would expect business owners
to cluster their donations on the days when their businesses are closed in any case. We would also
see the donation patterns of those out of the labor force to be distributed more evenly throughout
the week than either employees or business owners.
3.2.2 The choice of donation frequency
In addition to studying the distribution of donations across the days of the week, and the presence of
diﬀerent "types" of donors in terms of their reaction to material incentives, we investigate whether
the paid-day-oﬀ provision leads to an increase in the number of donations by donors aﬀected by the
policy. In terms of the theoretical framework outlined above, if the choice variable a represents the
number of donations, say, per year, then the analysis may be seen as one determining how diﬀerent
levels of the incentive y aﬀect the number of donations.
The fact that the day-oﬀ provision was in place throughout the entire period covered by our
data presents some challenges to estimating its impact, in particular on the extensive margin,
i.e., whether the provision attracted new donors. Aggregate time series on the number of AVIS
members at the national level, however, do not show any decline in the number of blood donors
following the introduction of the day-oﬀ privilege in 1967, and, if anything, the increase in donors
immediately after 1967 was above the trend (see Figure 10). This evidence is consistent with the
absence of any "crowding out" at the extensive margin. Moreover, the structure of our data, even
if they start after the introduction of the day-oﬀ provision, allows us to obtain a reliable estimate
of the eﬀect of the policy on the intensive margin. In particular, we exploit the fact that a group
of donors who are active in the 1985-89 period are still active donors in the 2002-06 period, and
a subset of these donors changed labor market status in the second period relative to the ﬁrst
period. Our strategy will use donors who are active in both periods and have not changed labor
market status as a control group, and will implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology where
the two "treatment" groups are: (1) donors who were self-employed or out of the labor force in
the ﬁrst period and became employees in the second period, and (2) donors who were employees
in the ﬁrst period and became self-employed or left the labor force in the second period. If the
day-oﬀ incentive does play a role in the donors’ choice of the frequency of donation, we expect
12to observe an increase in the donation frequency of group (1) and a decrease in the frequency of
group (2) relative to the group of donors who do not change labor market status. As with any
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation, our identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the policy,
the average outcomes for the "treated" (i.e., occupation switchers) and "control" (i.e., those who
do not change occupation) groups would have followed parallel paths over time. In the analysis
below we provide a discussion of whether this assumption is likely to be satisﬁed in our setting and
perform a number of robustness checks.
4 Empirical Results
The competing predictions outlined above will be tested against our data on The Town’s blood
donors. First, we focus on whether the choice of donation days by donors is consistent with extrinsic
incentives adding to altruistic motives, or whether donors give up additional material awards by
choosing days with lower or no rewards. Second, we assess whether the provision of a day oﬀ
increases the number of donations by donors aﬀected by the policy.
4.1 Economic considerations and the choice of donation days
Figures 1 and 2 report the distribution of donations across the days of the week by donors’ labor
market status, pooling the data from the two periods.18 Overall, Saturday emerges as the day in
which most donations occur — about four percentage points above a case of uniform distribution of
d o n a t i o n sa c r o s sd a y s( i . e . ,100%/6=1 6 .7%). When we disaggregate the distribution of donations
by the job status of the donors, however, we uncover substantial diﬀerences. Focusing on employees
only, Saturday remains the day with most donations, but a larger-than-average number of dona-
tions, around 20%, occur on Fridays. This "Friday eﬀect" is peculiar to employees. The "excess
fraction" of Friday donations (fraction Friday minus 16.7%)i se q u a lt o+3.26% for employees, with
a statistically signiﬁcant t-ratio of 8.77, against −0.96% (not statistically diﬀerent from zero) for
the unemployed and donors out of the labor force, and a statistically signiﬁcant −4.9% for the self-
employed (t-ratio = −6.29). Donations by the self-employed are strongly clustered on Mondays
and Saturdays. In Figure 3, where we disaggregate the employers so as to isolate the store owners
from the other entrepreneurs and self-employed, we notice that the store owners’ donations are
clustered on Mondays, when stores are closed, and the other employers’ donations are concentrated
on Saturdays, when the other businesses are closed. Finally, the donations by donors who are out
of the labor force are virtually uniformly distributed across weekdays.19
18Note that the distribution of donations across weekdays for all donors is virtually identical to that for donors
with non-missing labor market status. This indicates that the donors for whom the AVIS data contain labor market
information are essentially a random sample of the population of donors. In the remainder of the paper, we will limit
our attention to donors with non-missing labor market status information. Also, we replicated all of the analysis
performed in this section separately by period (1984-1988 and 2002-2006), and the results were very similar.
19The ﬁndings are very similar when we treat the day right before a series of national holidays as a Friday, and
the day after the holidays as a Monday. Holidays include January 1st, January 6th (the Epiphany), April 25th
13[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
In sum, all categories of workers appear to choose their donation days in a way consistent with
economic considerations entering with the standard sign into the utility function of donating blood:
Employees tend to exploit the long-weekend opportunity; entrepreneurs, who cannot enjoy a fully
paid day oﬀ, donate mostly on days when they would not have economic losses; and donors out of
the labor force, who do not have any positive or negative economic return from any day they choose,
display a uniform donation pattern throughout the week. For employees, in particular, economic
considerations, therefore, seem to prevail over concerns for the social stigma from donating on a
"mixed signal" day. At the same time, however, Saturday appears as the preferred day by a large
set of the donor population, including employees. These seemingly contradictory ﬁndings are, in
fact, consistent with the notion, postulated by the theory outlined in Section 3, that the overall
population of donors is heterogeneous in terms of the importance attached to social considerations.
It is also possible, however, that the sheer economic cost and beneﬁts might diﬀer for diﬀerent
donors, regardless of their altruistic attitudes and concerns about the social signal they send by
donating in a given day. To further investigate the possibly diﬀerent sources of the observed
heterogeneity, we perform two exercises. In the ﬁrst analysis, we ask whether donors show stable
patterns of behavior so as to indicate the existence of "types." In the second, we divide the sample
based on a priori diﬀerences in the economic advantage of donating in a given day and we explore
whether we can detect diﬀerent behaviors.
Thanks to the longitudinal nature of our data, we observe the same donor multiple times.
Taking the donor as the unit of observation, we compute the modal donation weekday for each
donor in each of the two periods.20 Figure 4 reports the distribution of the modal donation day by
donors’ labor market status. Since the patterns are fairly similar across periods, we focus on the
most recent one because of the lager sample size. Figure 4 reveals that Saturday is the preferred
donation day for 28 percent of the donors-employees, followed by Friday, which is preferred by 27
percent. The rest of the weekdays are preferred by 9 to 13 percent of donors-employees. As for the
self-employed, they tend to prefer Mondays and Saturdays, consistent with the discussion above,
while donors out of the labor force have more uniform preferences, with some overall preference,
however, for Saturday.
[Figure 4 about here]
Further investigation conﬁrms that these represent stable patterns of behavior. For example,
about 70 percent of donors-employees whose modal donation day is Friday never donate on Sat-
(Liberation Day), May 1st (Labor Day), June 2nd (Republic Day), August 15th (Assumption Day), November 1st
(All Saints Day), December 8th (Immaculate Conception Day) and December 25th (Christmas Day).
20To ensure that we compute meaningful modes, we restrict our attention to donors with at least 5 donations per
period. We have repeated our exercises with more stringent criteria (e.g., donors with at least 10 donations per
period) with virtually identical patterns. Our results, including those in the regressions presented below, are also
robust with respect to diﬀerent rules to break "ties" in the computation of modal donation days.
14urday, and about 50 percent of donors-employees whose modal day of donation is Saturday never
donate on Friday or Monday. Moreover, donors whose modal donation day is Friday are not diﬀerent
from donors whose modal donation day is Saturday along a number of observable characteristics,
including gender, age and occupation (see Table 4). These ﬁndings are consistent with presence of
diﬀerent "types" of contributors, as postulated in the framework of Benabou and Tirole (2006).
[Table 4 about here]
In order to further explore if the heterogeneity in donation day preference is attributable to
diﬀerent attitudes or just diﬀerent economic cost-beneﬁt considerations, we have broken down
donor employees by the type of employer (we have this additional information only on a subset
of employees and for the period 1985-89): small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms. We do not have direct
information on such measures of size as number of employees or revenues. However, given the
economic structure of The Town, the vast majority of private and local employers (i.e., those ﬁrms
which are not part of a large, national company) can be reasonably classiﬁed as small. Large
ﬁrms include banks, private or publicly owned companies oﬀering public services such as utilities
(electricity, telephone), and companies with a presence on a national level which also operate in
The Town. Arguably, workers in small ﬁrms will be more constrained in their ability to take a day
oﬀ. Anecdotal evidence indicates that this is indeed the case, as workers in small ﬁrms who take a
day oﬀ are typically required to make up for the time lost by exerting extra eﬀort upon their return.
Workers in large ﬁrms might be less "indispensable," therefore bearing a lower cost from leaving
work during a business day. Furthermore, although employers cannot prevent a worker from taking
the day oﬀ for the purpose of donating blood, the fear of being ﬁred might induce employees to
limit their use of the incentive. This concern is likely to be higher in small ﬁrms, since the Italian
law grants higher protection in case of an unfair layoﬀ to workers in large ﬁrms than to those in
smaller ﬁrms. (Garibaldi, Pacelli and Borgarello, 2004).21 Our conjecture is consistent with the
ﬁndings reported in Figures 5 and 6, for Employees in small ﬁrms have the lowest preference for
donating on Fridays or any other business days, while workers in large ﬁrms predominantly prefer
to donate on Friday: About 50% of employees in large ﬁrms have Friday as their modal donation
day, followed by 20% whose modal day is Monday; fewer than 10 percent of employees in large
ﬁrms choose Saturday as their preferred donation day. These ﬁndings, again, are consistent with
donors responding positively to economic incentives. Still, heterogeneity remains among donors,
even within a job category. In small ﬁrms, for example, 25% of employees have Friday as their
modal donation day and 30% choose Saturday.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
The relations we found in the raw data are robust to controls in regression analyses. Table
2 presents a series of estimates of the eﬀect of belonging to diﬀerent labor market categories on
21Ichino and Riphahn (2005) show that the provision of employment protection does indeed cause greater absen-
teeism among Italian workers.
15(1) the conditional probability of donating on a Friday and (2) the conditional probability that a
donor’s preferred (modal) day of donation is a Friday. In the ﬁrst set of regressions the unit of
observation is given by the donation, while in the second set each observation is a donor-period
pair. Controls include sex, age dummies, period eﬀects (for 1985-89 and 2002-06), and year eﬀects
in all speciﬁcations, and the standard errors are adjusted for clustering on labor market status and
period. Our main coeﬃcient of interest is that on the indicator variable for the donor being an
employee. This coeﬃcient estimate is consistently positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating
that employees have a higher conditional proba b i l i t yt od o n a t eo nF r i d a ya sw e l la sah i g h e r
probability of choosing Friday as their preferred donation day compared to the baseline group
of donors who are not employed, as well as compared to the self-employed. In Table 3 we report
the coeﬃcient estimates from running multinomial logit models with four possible outcomes. In
the ﬁrst set of regressions, the four outcomes are donating on (1) Monday, (2) Tuesday through
Thursday, (3) Friday and (4) Saturday. In the second set of regressions, the four outcomes are
given by the donors’ modal donation days. The results from Panel A of Table 3 conﬁrm that
donors-employees are signiﬁcantly more likely to donate on Friday than on any other day of the
week (with the exception of Saturday) compared to donors who are out of the labor force as well as
compared to the self-employed. The results from Panel B conﬁrm that donors who are employees
are more likely to choose Friday as their preferred donation day rather than any other day of the
week, including Saturday. In particular, the odds of an employee donating on Friday rather than
on Tuesday-Thursday are 1.46 times greater than for a donor who is non-employed and 2.56 times
higher than for donors who are self-employed. Further, the odds of an employee choosing Friday
rather than Tuesday-Thursday as his/her favorite donation day are 2 times higher than those of
non-employed donors and 2.31 times higher than those of the self-employed.
[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
4.2 Does the day-oﬀ incentive lead to more donations?
In the previous paragraphs we have established that a substantial fraction of donors who are
employees appear to choose their preferred donation day in a way that allows them to maximize
their extrinsic, economic beneﬁt by extending their weekend. We have interpreted this ﬁnding as
evidence that these donors do not seem to be concerned that donating on Friday might create
ambiguity as to the true reason behind their altruistic actions. Our ﬁndings also suggest that the
paid-day-oﬀ provision might induce donors-employees to donate more often than what they would
do without the incentive. In the remainder of this section, we assess whether this is the case. As
described in Section 3, we base our analysis on the set of donors who are present in both our sample
periods (1985-89 and 2002-06) and, in particular, on the subset of these donors who have changed
labor market status from one period to the next. We therefore exploit the within-donor shifts to
16determine whether changing labor market status is associated with diﬀerent donation frequencies.
The right-hand side of Table 1 describes the sample of donors who were active in both periods
1985-89 and 2002-06. This sample consists of 286 donors. Of the 153 donors for whom we have
labor market status information in both periods, 97 maintain the same labor market status in
2002-06 as in 1985-89, while the remaining 56 changed status.
We begin by asking whether donors who are employees donate more or less frequently, in general,
compared with other donors. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the number of donations per year
by labor market status. The fraction of donors making just one donation a year is about 27 percent
among employees, against 33 percent for the self-employed and 37 percent for the non-employed.
Conversely, while 43 percent of employees make 3 or more donations a year, this fraction is just 36
percent among the self-employed and 31 percent for those out of the labor force. As can be seen
in Figure 9, the same pattern is observed when we restrict the analysis to male donors only (a
considerable fraction of donors out of the labor force are females, and women are limited by law in
the number of donations they can make every year).
[Figures 8 and 9 about here]
The fact that donors-employees donate more frequently than both the self-employed and those
out of the labor force is suggestive of an eﬀect of the one-day paid leave of absence incentive. As a
ﬁrst step toward an evaluation of the causal nature of this ﬁnding, in columns (1) and (2) of Table
5 we report the results of individual ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of the number of donations made by
each donor each year on an employee indicator variable and a set of controls including age-group
dummies, period eﬀects (for 1985-89 and 2002-06), and year eﬀects. The models we estimate are
essentially diﬀerence-in diﬀerences models, where the control group consists of the donors who
are never employees and hence never enjoy the day-oﬀ beneﬁt. The coeﬃcient on the employee
indicator is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, identiﬁed, in our ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions, out
of the donors who switch labor market status, transitioning in or out of the "employee" status.
The inclusion of period eﬀects and year eﬀects ensures that the results are not driven by common
trends, and the ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation controls for unobservable, time-invariant donor-speciﬁc
characteristics possibly correlated with the frequency of donation (including "intrinsic" altruism).
In column (1), the sample consists of all donors observed in either 1985-89 or 2002-06 and with
known labor market status, while in the remaining columns we restrict the sample to donors who
are active in both periods. In columns (1) and (2), the coeﬃcient estimate on the employee dummy
is positive and strongly statistically signiﬁcant. Its magnitude indicates that employees make, on
average, about 0.65 more donations a year compared to non-employees.
[Table 5 about here]
Additional tests are performed to corroborate this ﬁnding. First, we recognize that if the
incentive does aﬀect the frequency of donations, it should do so in opposite ways for donors who
17were employees and became non-employees, and for donors who were non-employees and became
employees, and we analyze in detail these two groups of donors. In columns (3) and (4) of Table
5, we report results of ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions similar to those in columns (1) and (2), but we
divide donors into four categories: a) donors who were employees in both 1985-89 and 2002-06, b)
donors who were non-employees in both 1985-89 and 2002-06, c) donors who were non-employees
in 1985-89 and became employees in 2002-06, and d) donors who were employees in 1985-89 and
became non-employees in 2002-06. We deﬁne dummy variables for these groups and interact them
with the dummy variable for period 2002-06. We perform the analysis on male and female donors
together, as well as separately for males.22 Our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients of interest are
those on the interactions of the 2002-06 dummy and the labor market transitions indicators. The
coeﬃcient on the (2002-06) dummy is quite small and not statistically diﬀerent from zero, which
indicates that there was no signiﬁcant change in the yearly frequency of donations for the baseline
group (i.e., donors who were employees in both periods). The coeﬃcient on the (2002-06)*(never-
an-employee) interaction is also very small and not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This indicates
that donors who were not employees in both periods also did not experience a change in the number
of yearly donations between the two periods. The coeﬃcient on the (2002-06)*(other-to-employee)
interaction, however, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that donors who became
employees increased their donations compared to donors who did not change labor market status,
net of year eﬀects, period eﬀects, and individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. In general (column 3) as well
as in the case of males (column 4), the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is substantial, since it suggests
that donors who become employees, on average, increase their donations by about one donation
per year. The coeﬃcient on the (2002-06)*(employee-to-other) interaction, on the other hand, is
negative and, in the case of males, statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates that donors who ceased
to be employees (and hence lose the incentive of the paid day oﬀ) reduced their donations by about
0.6 donations a year. We also report results from multinomial logit estimations of the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences models described above. Table 6 shows that there was, indeed, a switch from a low
number of donations per year to a higher frequency for donors who became employees, and a switch
away from high frequency to lower frequency for donors who were employees and entered another
labor market status, thereby losing the day-oﬀ beneﬁt.
The second set of robustness checks concerns the crucial identifying assumption that the average
outcomes for the "treated" (i.e., occupation switchers) and "control" (i.e., those who do not change
occupation) groups would have followed parallel paths over time in the absence of the policy. In
other words, our interpretation of the eﬀect of the day-oﬀ provision on the number of donations is
valid provided that no other factor which is associated with changing occupation is systematically
associated with donation frequency. The two main changes associated with changing labor market
22Because of the very small size of the female subsample (just 15 individuals), we are not able to obtain meaningful
estimates for this group of donors.
18status and which could, in principle, also be associated with changes in donation behavior, are
changes in family structure and changes in health.23 In an attempt to limit the potential bias (the
sign of which is, moreover, unclear) coming from these forces, we exploit the fact that both these
changes are strongly associated with aging. While all of the donors who are active in both 1985-89
and 2002-06 are aging at the same rate, not all donors started at the same point. In particular, those
who were out of the labor force and then became employed were, in 1985-89, of relatively young age
(29 years old on average). Conversely, those who were employees and then left the labor force were
relatively older in the ﬁrst period. Even though our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regressions did include
age-group dummies, it is possible that the (2002-06)*(labor-market-transition) dummies might be
capturing age eﬀects, possibly associated with changes in health or family structure. To explore
this possibility, we conduct a series of robustness checks. First, in columns (5) and (6) of Table
5, we restrict the sample to donors of ages 18-32 and 20-30, respectively, in 1985-89. Although
the sample size is substantially reduced, this restriction ensures that donors in the "treatment"
and "control" groups are of comparable ages. The results of column (5) and (6) conﬁrm and
strengthen the previous ﬁndings, as they indicate that becoming an employee and ceasing to be
an employee are associated with 1.0-1.6 additional donations per year and 1.4-1.5 less donations
per year, respectively. In Table 7 we explicitly investigate the relationship between aging and
donation frequency. In columns (1) through (4), we use all donors and all 22 years (1985-2006) in
our dataset. Column (1) reports results from an OLS regression of the number of donations per
donor per year on a series of age, gender, and year dummies, as well as a year-of-ﬁrst-donation
dummies. The coeﬃcients on the age dummies are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, although
their magnitude is quite small. Once individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included (columns 2 through 4), the
age coeﬃcients become even smaller in magnitude (especially in the case of males) and statistically
indistinguishable from zero, for the whole sample (column 2) as well as for the male (column 3)
and female donors (column 4) separately. These results indicate that once individual heterogeneity
is taken into account, there is no systematic relationship between age and donation frequency. The
results are conﬁrmed once we restrict the sample to donors active in both 1985-89 and 2002-06
(columns 5 and 6) and we reproduce our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimations including both time-
age and time-employment transitions interactions. In fact, we observe that the age dummies are
never statistically signiﬁcant while the sign, size, and signiﬁcance of the employment transitions
interactions (diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates) are essentially unchanged compared to our main
speciﬁcation of Table 5.
[Table 7 about here]
23The AVIS data do contain some health indicators, in particular blood pressure, height, and weight, but only for
the period 1985-89.
195 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The ﬁndings of this paper suggest that individuals are responsive to economic considerations in
their blood donation decisions in a way that is largely consistent with standard economic intuition.
In fact, we found that a substantial fraction of donors who are employees choose their preferred
donation day in a way that allows them to maximize their extrinsic, economic beneﬁt by extending
their weekend. This indicates that "material" considerations dominate over the potentially negative
self- and social-image eﬀects of responding positively to economic incentives. At the same time,
we also ﬁnd evidence consistent with the notion, postulated by the theory of Benabou and Tirole
(2006), that the overall population of donors is heterogeneous in terms of the degree of intrinsic
altruism and the relative importance they attach to economic rewards and concerns about their
social image.
Our paper contributes to the ongoing debate on whether explicit incentives should be used
to stimulate pro-social behavior, including blood donation and organ donation for transplants.24
A large body of literature argues against the provision of such incentives, on the basis that they
might crowd out intrinsic motivation thus leading to a net reduction of pro-social behavior.25 The
evidence we presented in this paper suggests that those concerns are not always warranted. Further
research is needed to establish whether other forms of material rewards, e.g., paying donors with
cash, would obtain the same results, and how the size of the reward inﬂuences behavior. Evidence
from donor surveys suggests that donors might respond more negatively to cash rewards than to
in-kind rewards of the same nominal value (Lacetera and Macis, 2008b), while the experiments of
Mellstrom and Johanneson (2008) indicate that male donors are not negatively aﬀected by cash
rewards. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), moreover, ﬁnd a non-linearity in the response of pro-social
behavior to material rewards, with small prizes reducing the provision of the altruistic activity, and
larger prizes enhancing it. The paid-leave incentive analyzed in this paper could be seen as a large
incentive, thus our ﬁndings are in line with the experimental evidence of Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000). Additional research is warranted also on the structure of material rewards. For example,
as noted above, the speciﬁc incentive studied in this paper is designed so that donors can decide
not to take advantage of it, and therefore allows for diﬀerent tastes and attitudes by potentially
diﬀerent donors to be satisﬁed. Other incentive schemes do not always allow for this ﬂexibility.
The incentive we have studied, and its behavioral eﬀects, have social welfare consequences in
that they impact the voluntary supply of blood, and might inform associations and policymakers
on how to reduce frequent situations of supply shortages. We found that in addition to aﬀecting
the choice of when to donate, the right to a paid leave of absence for employees is associated with
an increase in yearly donations by this category of donors. These results indicate that removing
the policy would likely result in a reduced number of donations. Welfare comparisons, however,
24On organ donations, see Becker and Elias (2007).
25In the case of organ donation, "repug n a n c e "i sa l s os e e na sab a r r i e rt ot h ec r e a t i o no fa ne x p l i c i tm a r k e tf o r
organs (Roth 2007.)
20have to balance the gains from the policy with its costs to taxpayers. A conservative measure of
the gains (i.e., abstracting from extensive margin eﬀects) is that the policy leads donors-employees
to make one extra donation per year. The government, however, must ﬁnance all donations made
by donors-employees, i.e., about three donations per donor per year. The evaluation is complicated
by the diﬃculty to estimate the value of an extra pint of blood, but this paper has provided one
essential ingredient that was previously absent from the debate.
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Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 37.8 10.7 40.3 10.6 34.8 8.2 48.7 8.3
Body Mass Index 24.6 3.3 24.4 3.1
Blood Pressure 127.4 9.6 126.6 7.7
Donations/year 2.4 1.1 2.3 1.5 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.6
B. Employment Status
M a l e sF e m a l e s M a l e sF e m a l e s M a l e sF e m a l e s M a l e sF e m a l e s
Employees 0.71 0.41 0.67 0.48 0.70 0.43 0.69 0.53
   Employed in small firms 0.63 0.40 - - 0.66 0.43 - -
   Employed in large firms 0.08 0.01 - - 0.04 0.00 - -
Self-Employed 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.13
   Store owners 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10
   Other 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.03
Non-employed 0.19 0.54 0.19 0.44 0.19 0.52 0.19 0.33
   Students 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.35 0.02 0.03
   Housekeepers 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.23
   Retired 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03
   Other 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
N donors with valid labor 






All donors Donors active in both periods
1985-89 2002-06
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of blood donors in The Town. Notes: A. Physical characteris-
tics (BMI and blood pressure) are available only for the period 1985-89. B. The category "Self-
Employed" also includes entrepreneurs who employ other workers.








Employee 0.0421*** 0.0374*** 0.0359*** 0.0410*** 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.0990** 0.0943**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.027) (0.030) (0.039) (0.046)
Self-Employed -0.0397*** -0.0445*** -0.0521*** -0.00492 -0.0529 -0.0528 -0.0742* 0.0889
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.034) (0.039) (0.044) (0.110)
Female -0.0256*** -0.0585**
(0.008) (0.028)
age 30-39 0.00646 0.011 -0.0175 -0.0282 -0.0506 0.0398
(0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.036) (0.044) (0.069)
age 40-49 -0.013 -0.0133 -0.0118 -0.0443 -0.0583 -0.00807
(0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.037) (0.046) (0.060)
age 50 + -0.0276*** -0.0351*** 0.000453 -0.0847** -0.114** 0.00917
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.036) (0.045) (0.063)
2002-2006 dummy 0.0122 0.0154 0.00777 0.018 -0.0205 0.0575 -0.0248 0.208***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.034) (0.063) (0.064) (0.072) (0.069)
Constant 0.147*** 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.118*** 0.151** 0.186*** 0.226*** -0.0595
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.032) (0.059) (0.062) (0.072) (0.046)
Observations 16,618 16,578 13,139 3,439 1,308 1,304 1,020 284
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Dependent variable = 1 if donation occurs on Friday, 0 
otherwise
Dependent variable = 1 if donor's modal donation day 
is Friday, 0 otherwise
Table 2: Estimated eﬀect of occupation on the conditional probability of donating on Friday and
on Friday being the modal day of donation. Notes: Linear probability models on pooled 1985-
1989 and 2002-2006 sample. The omitted category is non-employed males ages 18-29. Controls
include period ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Observations denote number of donations in (1)
through (4) and number of donors in (5) through (8). In (5) through (8) only donors with at least
5 donations are included in the sample. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
25Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Coefficient Z P>|z| e^b
Friday Monday 0.27 4.6 0.000 1.31
Friday Tuesday-Thursday 0.38 12.9 0.000 1.46
Friday Saturday -0.03 -0.6 0.560 0.97
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Coefficient Z P>|z| e^b
Friday Monday 0.94 8.4 0.000 2.56
Friday Tuesday-Thursday 0.38 13.3 0.000 1.47
Friday Saturday 0.82 6.1 0.000 2.26
Observations
Wald Chi2 (p>Chi2)
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Coefficient Z P>|z| e^b
Friday Monday 1.02 3.6 0.000 2.78
Friday Tuesday-Thursday 0.77 3.5 0.000 2.16
Friday Saturday 0.32 1.4 0.170 1.37
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Coefficient Z P>|z| e^b
Friday Monday 1.53 4.2 0.000 4.60
Friday Tuesday-Thursday 0.79 2.5 0.012 2.20








B. Dependent variable: Donors' Modal Day of Donation
A. Dependent Variable: Day of Donation
Employee vs self-Employed
Employee vs Non-employed
Odds comparing alternative 
1 to alternative 2
Odds comparing alternative 
Employee vs Non-employed
Table 3: Friday Eﬀect, multinomial logit analysis. In each panel, the ﬁrst column reports the raw
coeﬃcients, the second the z-score for test of coeﬀ=0, the third the associated p-value. The fourth
column reports the factor change in odds of alternative 1 relative to alternative 2 for a unit increase
in the independent variable. Controls include sex, age dummies, period ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed
eﬀects.
26Friday Saturday Friday Saturday
S e x 0 . 0 50 . 1 50 . 2 20 . 2 4
A g e  1 8 - 2 9 0 . 2 50 . 2 10 . 1 40 . 1 3
A g e  3 0 - 3 9 0 . 3 40 . 3 70 . 3 60 . 3 8
A g e  4 0 - 4 9 0 . 3 30 . 3 20 . 3 50 . 3 3
A g e  5 0  + 0 . 0 80 . 1 10 . 1 50 . 1 5
B l o o d  t y p e  0 0 . 5 90 . 5 70 . 5 00 . 5 1
B l o o d  t y p e  A 0 . 3 80 . 3 90 . 3 70 . 3 8
B l o o d  t y p e  B 0 . 0 00 . 0 50 . 0 90 . 0 8
Blood type AB 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04
Years since joined AVIS 7.07 6.16 7.23 6.71
N of donations per year 2.43 2.47 2.53 2.30
White collar worker 44.29 35.37 50.41 46.24
Blue collar worker 37.16 39.24 38.84 40.14
T e a c h e r 5 . 7 16 . 1 06 . 6 17 . 1 7
D r i v e r  ( b u s ,  t a x i ) 2 . 8 69 . 7 60 . 4 11 . 0 8
Military, Police 0.00 1.22 2.48 3.95
Store clerk 2.86 1.22 0.41 0.36
F i r e f i g h t e r 0 . 0 01 . 2 20 . 0 00 . 3 6
O t h e r 7 . 1 25 . 8 70 . 8 40 . 7 0
N of Donors 70 82 242 279
1985-1989 2002-2006
Modal donation day Modal donation day




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002-06 Dummy -0.250 0.030 -0.285 -0.039 -0.122 -0.901*** -0.682 -2.029* -1.161
(0.170) (0.250) (0.320) (0.330) (0.760) (0.330) (1.030) -1.200 (1.670)
Employee Dummy 0.655*** 0.656***
(0.210) (0.210)
(2002-06)*(Never an Employee) 0.040 0.059 0.434 0.221 0.145 0.082 0.503
(0.300) (0.330) (0.510) (0.740) (0.440) (0.490) (1.070)
(2002-06)*(Employee-to-Other) -0.455 -0.586** -1.403*** -1.868*** -0.216 -0.362 -1.444*
(0.290) (0.280) (0.350) (0.290) (0.480) (0.490) (0.840)
(2002-06)*(Other-to-Employee) 0.840** 0.921** 1.390** 1.489** 1.309** 1.422** 2.340**
(0.380) (0.430) (0.640) (0.730) (0.540) (0.580) (1.060)
age 30-39 0.035 -0.052 -0.117 -0.176 -0.274 0.147 -1.270*** -1.223*** -1.453
(0.083) (0.220) (0.230) (0.250) (0.410) (0.580) (0.430) (0.430) (0.880)
age 40-49 0.219* 0.175 0.161 -0.058 0.056 0.644*** -0.816 -0.927 -1.281
(0.130) (0.290) (0.330) (0.350) (0.640) (0.140) (0.630) (0.680) (1.260)
age 50 + 0.119 0.056 0.019 -0.255 0.611 -1.813** -1.749* 0.000
(0.170) (0.430) (0.480) (0.520) (0.850) (0.910) (0.960) 0.000
Constant 2.046*** 2.266*** 2.821*** 2.886*** 2.614*** 2.678*** 3.651*** 3.699*** 2.848***
(0.200) (0.250) (0.200) (0.220) (0.210) (0.270) (0.340) (0.360) (0.350)
Donor-Year Observations 6,916 1,593 1,221 1,111 408 288 306 276 86
N of donors (FE) 1,870 253 153 138 57 42 153 138 43
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.45
Dependent Variable: Number of donations per year
Donors active in both 1985-1989 and 2002-2006
Donors with known labor market transition
Table 5: Number of donations per year: ﬁxed eﬀects regressions results. In (1) the sample includes
all donors with valid labor market information. In (2) the sample includes donors who were active
in both 1985-89 and 2002-06 and with valid labor market information. In (3) through (9), the
sample includes only donors who are active in both periods, and with valid labor market status
information for both periods. The omitted "job transition" category consists of donors who were
employees in both 1985-89 and 2002-06. Controls include year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Observations are donors-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Coeff. Z P>|z| e^b Coeff. Z P>|z| e^b
1 2 -0.06 -0.12 0.905 0.94 -0.25 -0.49 0.622 0.78
1 3 -0.16 -0.32 0.747 0.85 -0.22 -0.42 0.676 0.80
2 3 -0.10 -0.23 0.820 0.90 0.03 0.06 0.950 1.03
4+ 1 1.08 2.21 0.027 2.93 1.27 2.43 0.015 3.57
4+ 2 1.02 2.29 0.022 2.77 1.02 2.16 0.031 2.77
4+ 3 0.91 1.97 0.049 2.50 1.05 2.14 0.032 2.85
Observations
Wald Chi2 (p>Chi2)
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Coeff. Z P>|z| e^b Coeff. Z P>|z| e^b
1 2 0.37 0.74 0.461 1.45 0.33 0.63 0.530 1.39
1 3 0.36 0.72 0.472 1.43 0.34 0.66 0.509 1.41
2 3 -0.01 -0.03 0.979 0.99 0.01 0.03 0.977 1.01
4+ 1 -1.16 -1.98 0.048 0.31 -1.26 -2.13 0.034 0.28
4+ 2 -0.78 -1.47 0.141 0.46 -0.93 -1.74 0.083 0.39
4+ 3 -0.80 -1.52 0.128 0.45 -0.92 -1.74 0.082 0.40
Observations
Wald Chi2 (p>Chi2)









Odds comparing alternative 
1 to alternative 2
Males Males and Females
Employee to Other
Other to Employee
Odds comparing alternative 
1 to alternative 2
1,221 1,111
89.64 (0.0003)
Odds comparing alternative 
1 to alternative 2
Odds comparing alternative 
1 to alternative 2
78.77 (0.003)
Table 6: Eﬀect of switching occupation on the number of donations per year. Notes: The Table
reports results from estimating multinomial logit models. Each observation is a donor-year pair.
The dependent variable can take four values: 1 donation per year, 2 donations, 3 donations and 4
or more donations per year. The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating
the labor market transition of an individual between the periods 1985-89 and 2002-06 interacted
with a 2002-06 indicator variable. Controls include sex, age dummies and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In each
panel, the ﬁrst column reports the raw coeﬃcients, the second the z-score for test of coeﬀ=0, the
third the associated p-value. The fourth column reports the factor change in odds of Alternative 1




Females Males Females Males and 
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.494***
(0.023)
age 30-39 0.100*** -0.00588 -0.0462 0.0904 -0.165 -0.218
(0.025) (0.044) (0.047) (0.100) (0.260) (0.290)
age 40-49 0.240*** 0.0753 0.0133 0.225 0.162 -0.0293
(0.029) (0.072) (0.079) (0.160) (0.350) (0.380)
age 50 + 0.249*** 0.0811 0.0053 0.268 0.111 -0.195
(0.038) (0.100) (0.110) (0.210) (0.450) (0.480)
2002-06 Dummy -0.141 0.129
(0.450) (0.450)
(2002-2006)*(age 30-39)
(2002-2006)*(age 40-49) -0.169 -0.231
(0.400) (0.410)
(2002-2006)*(age 50+) -0.274 -0.248
(0.470) (0.480)






Constant 3.116*** 2.516*** 2.604*** 2.294*** 2.839*** 2.895***
(0.240) (0.058) (0.066) (0.110) (0.210) (0.230)
Donor-Year Observations 14,994 16,868 13,167 3,701 1,221 1,111
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.05
N of donors (FE) 2303 1618 685 153 138
Dependent Variable: Number of donations per year
All years (1985-2006)
Donors active in both 1985-1989 
and 2002-2006 and with known 
labor market transition (years 
1985-89 and 2002-06)
Table 7: Relationship between age and the number of donations per year. (1) reports results from
an OLS regression using the entire sample of donors observed over years 1985-2006. Columns (2)
through (6) report results from ﬁxed eﬀects regressions on various sub-samples. In columns (5)
through (6), the omitted "job transition" category consists of donors who wee employees in both
1985-89 and 2002-06. Controls include year ﬁxed eﬀects and, in (1), year-of-ﬁrst-donation ﬁxed
eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are donors-year. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1













Figure 1: Distribution of donations by day of the week and labor market status, in % terms. Pooled












Figure 2: Distribution of donations by day of the week and labor market status, in % terms. Pooled















Figure 3: Distribution of donations by day of the week, in % terms, for entrepreneurs and self-















Figure 4: Distribution of the modal donation day by donors’ labor market status. Pooled 1985-89












Figure 5: Distribution of donations by day of the week, in % terms, for employees, divided by those
















Figure 6: Distribution of the modal donation day, in % terms, for employees, divided by those
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Figure 7: Paid leave of absence: take-up rates by donation weekday and by donors’ modal donaiton
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Figure 8: Distribution of Number of Donations per Year, by labor market status. Pooled 1985-89
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Figure 9: Distribution of Number of Donations per Year, by labor market status. Pooled 1985-89
























Figure 10: Number of AVIS members in Italy and in Bologna (a major city in the Center-North of
Italy), years 1961-1975. The vertical lines indicate the year the Law introducing the paid leave of
absence for donors was passed (1967), and the year when AVIS started a national media campaign
to inform donors about its activities (1971).
36